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Abstract
In this paper we present a framework for secure identifi-
cation using deep neural networks, and apply it to the task
of template protection for face authentication. We use deep
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to learn a mapping
from face images to maximum entropy binary (MEB) codes.
The mapping is robust enough to tackle the problem of ex-
act matching, yielding the same code for new samples of a
user as the code assigned during training. These codes are
then hashed using any hash function that follows the ran-
dom oracle model (like SHA-512) to generate protected face
templates (similar to text based password protection). The
algorithm makes no unrealistic assumptions and offers high
template security, cancelability, and state-of-the-art match-
ing performance. The efficacy of the approach is shown on
CMU-PIE, Extended Yale B, and Multi-PIE face databases.
We achieve high (∼ 95%) genuine accept rates (GAR) at
zero false accept rate (FAR) with up to 1024 bits of template
security.
1. Introduction
Authentication on the basis of “who we are” instead of
“something we possess” or “something we remember”, of-
fers convenience and often, stronger system security. One
of the important factors related to making biometric pass-
words as widespread as text based ones is that of template
protection. Text based password authentication provides
strong template protection whereas biometric data gener-
ally suffers from lesser protection due to difficulties in ex-
act matching. Given the sensitive nature of biometric data,
algorithms that provide the same level of template secu-
rity without compromising on matching accuracy would be
ideal.
A typical password authentication system would use a
sample of the user’s password to extract and store a tem-
plate from it. It is desirable that this template is stored in a
protected and cancelable manner for the purpose of system
security. During authentication, a new template is extracted
from the presented password and matched to the stored tem-
plate. Depending on the matching score, access is granted
or denied. In the case of text based passwords, a one way
non-invertible transform (i.e. a hash) of it is stored as the
template. During verification, a password is entered and its
hash value is calculated. The hash is compared with the
stored hash and if the two strings matched exactly, their
hashes would match as well, and access would be granted.
In such a scenario, the stored hash reveals no information
about the original password (protection) and also, if the
password is compromised, it can be changed and a new
password can be registered (cancelability).
This kind of security would be ideal for biometric based
authentication as well but, unlike text passwords, biometric
modalities lack two important aspects. 1) They rarely match
exactly between different readings, and 2) they cannot be
changed if compromised. Thus, the objective of cancelable
biometrics approaches is to extract template from biometric
modalities that are 1) protected i.e. given the template, it
should be infeasible to extract any information about the
original modality, and 2) cancelable i.e. if compromised, it
should be possible to extract a new template from the same
modality.
1.1. Contribution
We tackle these objectives by using a deep convolutional
neural network (CNN) to learn a robust mapping of face
classes to maximum entropy binary (MEB) codes. The
mapping is robust enough to tackle the problem of exact
matching, yielding the same code for new samples of a user
as the code assigned during training. This exact matching
enables us to store a hash of the code as the template of
the user. The hash function used could be any function
that follows the random oracle model, and in our case we
choose SHA-512 since it is the current standard for string
based passwords and offers strong security. Once hashed,
the template has no correlation with the code assigned to
the user. Furthermore, the codes assigned to users are bit-
wise randomly generated and thus, possess maximum en-
tropy, and have no correlation with the original biometric
modality (the user’s face). These properties make attacks on
the template very difficult, leaving brute force attacks as the
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only feasible option. Cancelability is achieved by changing
the codes assigned to users and re-learning the mapping.
Exploiting the large learning capacity of the CNN with
powerful regularization, we also achieve state-of-the-art
matching performance on PIE, Extended Yale B and Multi-
PIE databases. Note that, in this work, we focus on the
use-case of using faces as passwords and thus, validate our
results on data collected in controlled environments.
1.2. Related Work
A variety of template protection algorithms have been
applied to faces. Schemes that used cryptosystem based ap-
proaches include Fuzzy commitment schemes by Ao and
Li [1], Lu et al. [11] and Van Der Veen et al. [23], and
fuzzy vault by Wu and Qiu [24]. In general, the fuzzy com-
mitment schemes suffered from limited error correcting ca-
pacity or short keys. In Fuzzy vault schemes the data is
stored in the open between chaff points, and this also causes
an overhead in storage space. Some quantization schemes
were used by Sutcu et al. [16, 17] to generate somewhat
stable keys. There were also several works that combine
the face data with user specific keys. These include com-
bination with a password by Chen and Chandran [2], user
specific token binding by Ngo et al. [12, 21, 22], biomet-
ric salting by Savvides et al. [14], and user specific random
projection schemes by Teoh and Yuang [20] and Kim and
Toh [9]. Hybrid approaches that combine transform based
cancelability with cryptosystem based security like [5] have
also been proposed but give out user specific information
to generate the template creating possibilities of masquer-
ade attacks. Pandey and Govindraju [13] proposed a secu-
rity centric scheme that used features extracted from local
regions of the face to obtain exact matching and thus, bene-
fited from the security of hash functions. Although more se-
cure, the matching accuracy of the scheme suffered and the
feature space being hashed was not uniformly distributed.
On the image recognition side, deep CNNs algorithms
like Deepface [18] have shown exceptional performance
and hold the current state-of-the-art results for face recog-
nition. There is also some recent work that seeks to map
data to binary codes using deep neural networks like [3].
Although mapping to binary codes (or learning hash func-
tions) in this manner may seem similar to our approach,
these methods are fundamentally different from what we
are trying to achieve. Algorithms such as [3] seek to learn
a natural binary representation of the data and thus, the bi-
nary codes they map to are correlated to the data distribu-
tion. Our MEB codes have no correlation to the original
data distribution. This gives us the template security we
seek, but also makes it a more challenging problem since
the mapping function we seek to learn is more complex.
Figure 1: Overview of the algorithm.
2. Algorithm
In this section of the paper we describe the individual
components of our architecture in more detail. An overview
of the algorithm is shown in Figure 1.
2.1. Convolutional Neural Networks
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [10] are biolog-
ically inspired models, which contain three basic compo-
nents: convolution, pooling and fully connected layers. In
the convolution layer one tries to learn a filter bank given
input feature maps. The input of a convolution layer is a 3D
tensor with d number of 2D feature maps of size n1 × n2.
Let xijk denote the component at row j and column k in
the ith feature map, and we use x(l)i to denote the complete
ith feature map at layer l. If one wants to learn hf set of
filters of size f1 × f2, the output x(l+1) for the next layer
will still be a 3D tensor with hf number of 2D feature maps
of size (n1 − f1 + 1)× (n2 − f2 + 1). More formally, the
convolution layer computes the following:
x
(l+1)
j = s(
∑
i
F
(l)
ij ∗ x(l)i + b(l)j ) (1)
where F (l)ij denotes the filter that connects feature map xi to
output map x(l)j at layer l, b
(l)
j is the bias for the jth output
feature map, s(·) is some element-wise non-linearity func-
tion and ∗ denotes the discrete 2D convolution.
The pooling (or subsample) layer takes a 3D feature map
and tries to down-sample/summarize the content with less
spatial resolution. Pooling is commonly done for every
feature map independently and with non-overlapping win-
dows. An intuition of such operation is to have some built
in invariance against small translations as well as reduce the
spatial resolution and thus save computation for the upper
layers. For average (mean) pooling, the output will be the
average value inside the pooling window, and for max pool-
ing the output will be the maximum value inside the pooling
window.
The fully connected layer connects all the input units
from the lower layer l to all the output units in the next layer
l + 1. In more detail, the next layer output is calculated by:
x(l+1) = s(W (l)x(l) + b(l)) (2)
where x(l) is the vectorized input from layer l, W (l) and b(l)
are the parameters of the fully connected layers at layer l.
A CNN is commonly composed of several stacks of con-
volution and pooling layers followed by a few fully con-
nected layers. The last layer is normally associated with
some loss to provide training signals, and the training for
CNN can be done by doing gradient descent on the param-
eters with respect to the loss. For example, in classification
the last layer is normally a softmax layer and cross entropy
loss is calculated against the 1 of K representation of the
class labels. In more detail, let x(L) = Wx(L−1) + b be
the pre-activation of the last layer, t denotes the final output
and tk the kth component of t, and y denote the target 1 of
K vector and yk the kth dimension of that vector, then
tk =
exp{x(L)k }∑
j exp{x(L)j }
(3)
L(t,y) =
∑
j
yj log tj (4)
where L is the loss function.
2.2. Maximum Entropy Binary Codes
Our first step of training is to assign unique codes to
each user to be enrolled. From a template security point
of view, these codes should ideally possess two properties.
First, they should posses high entropy. Since a hash of these
codes is the final protected template, the higher the entropy
of the codes, the larger the search space for a brute force
attack would be. In order to make brute force attacks in the
code domain infeasible, we use binary codes with a min-
imum size K = 256 bits and experiment with values up
to K = 1024 bits. The second desirable property of the
codes is that they should not be correlated with the original
biometric modality. Any correlation between the biomet-
ric samples and the secure codes can be exploited by an
attacker to reduce the search space during a brute force at-
tack. One example to illustrate this can be to think of binary
features extracted from faces. Even though the dimension-
ality of the feature vector may be high, given the feature
extraction algorithm and type of data, the number of possi-
ble values the vector can take is severely reduced. In order
to prevent such reduction of entropy, the codes we used are
bit-wise randomly generated and have no correlation with
the original biometric samples. This makes the space to
be hashed truly uniformly distributed. More precisely, let
ci ∼ B(1, 0.5) be the binary variable for each bit of the
code, where B(1, 0.5) is the maximum entropy Bernoulli
distribution, and the resultant MEB code with K indepen-
den bits is thus C = [c1, c2, . . . , cK ]. We denote the code
for user u by Cu.
2.3. Learning the Mapping
In order to learn a robust mapping of a user’s face sam-
ples to the codes, we make some modifications to the CNN
training procedure. The 1 of K encoding of the class labels
is replaced by the MEB codes Cu assigned to each user.
Since we now want several bits of the network output to be
one instead of a single bit, we use sigmoid activation instead
of softmax. In more detail:
tk =
1
1 + exp{−x(L)j }
(5)
L(t,C) =
∑
j
{cj log tj + (1− cj) log(1− tj)} (6)
where tk is the kth output from the last layer and L is the
binary cross entropy loss.
2.3.1 Data Augmentation
Deep learning algorithms generally require a large number
of training samples whereas, training samples are generally
limited in the case of biometric data. In order to magnify
the number of training samples per user, we perform the
following data augmentation. For each training sample of
size m × m we extract all possible crops of size n × n.
Each crop is also flipped along its vertical axis yielding a
total of 2 × (m − n + 1) × (m − n + 1) crops. The crops
are then re-sized back to m × m and used for training the
CNN.
2.3.2 Regularization
The large learning capacity of deep neural networks comes
with the inherent risk of over-fitting. The number of pa-
rameters in the network are often enough to memorize the
entire training set, and the performance of such a network
does not generalize to new data. In addition to general con-
cerns, mapping to MEB codes is equivalent to learning a
highly complex function, where each dimension of the func-
tion output can be regarded as an arbitrary binary partition
of the classes. This further increases the risk of over-fitting
and powerful regularization techniques need be employed
to achieve good matching performance.
We apply dropout [8] on all fully connected layers with
0.5 probability of discarding one hidden activation. Dropout
is a very effective regularizer and can also be regarded as
training an ensemble of an exponential number of neural
networks that share the same parameters, therefore reducing
the variance of the resulting model.
2.4. Protected Template
Even though MEB codes assigned to each user have no
correlation with the original samples, another step of tak-
ing a hash of the code is required to generate the protected
template. Given the parameters of the network, it is not pos-
sible to entirely recover the original samples from the code
(due to the max pooling operation in the forward pass of the
network) but, some information is leaked. Using a hash di-
gest of the code as the final protected template prevents any
information leakage. The hash function used can be any
function that follows the random oracle model. For our ex-
periments we utilized SHA-512, yielding the final protected
template Tu = SHA512(Cu).
During verification, a new sample of the enrolled user is
fed through the network to get the network output yout =
t. We then binarize this output via a simple threshold-
ing operation yielding the code for the sample sout =
[s1, s2, . . . , sK ], where si = 1(ti > 0.5) and 1(·) is the
indicator function. At this point, the SHA-512 hash of the
code, Hout = SHA512(sout) could be taken and com-
pared with the stored hash Tu for the user. Due to the
exact matching nature of the framework, this would yield
a matching score of true/false nature. This is not ideal for
a biometric based authentication system since it is desirable
to obtain a tunable score in order to adjust the false accept
(FAR) and false reject rates (FRR). In order to obtain an ad-
justable score, several crops and their flipped counterparts
are taken for the new sample (in the manner described in
Section 2.3.1) and Hout is calculated for each one, yielding
a set of hashes H. We define the final matching score as
the number of Houts in H that match the stored template,
scaled by the cardinality ofH. Thus, the score for matching
against user u is given by,
score =
∑
Hi∈H 1(Hi = Tu)
|H| (7)
Now the score can be set to achieve the desired value of
FAR/FRR. Note that, the framework provides the flexibility
to work in both verification and identification modes. For
identification H can be matched against templates of all the
users stored in the database.
3. Experiments
We now describe the databases, evaluation protocols,
and specifics of the parameters used for experimental eval-
uation.
3.1. Databases
In this study we tackle the the problem of using faces as
passwords and thus, choose face databases that have been
collected in controlled environments for experimentation.
We use evaluation protocols including variations in lighting,
session and pose that would be typical to the application.
The CMU PIE [15] database consists of 41,368 images
of 68 people under 13 different poses, 43 different illumina-
tion conditions, and with 4 different expressions. We use 5
poses (c27, c05, c29, c09 and c07) and all illumination vari-
ations for our experiments. 10 images are randomly chosen
for training and the rest are used for testing.
The extended Yale Face Database B [6] contains 2432
images of 38 subjects with frontal pose and under different
illumination variations. We use the cropped version of the
database for our experiments. Again, we use 10 randomly
selected images for training and the rest for testing.
The CMU Multi-PIE [7] face database contains more
than 750,000 images of 337 people recorded in 4 differ-
ent sessions, 15 view points and 19 illumination conditions.
We use this database to highlight the algorithm’s robustness
to changes in session and lighting conditions. We chose
two sessions (3 and 4) which had the most number of com-
mon users (198) between them. 10 randomly chosen frontal
faces from session 3 were used for enrollment and all frontal
faces from session 4 were used for verification.
3.2. Evaluation Metrics
We use the genuine accept rate (GAR) at 0 false accept
rate (FAR) as the evaluation metric. We also report the equal
error rate (EER) as an alternative operating point for the
system. Since the train-test splits we use are randomly gen-
erated, we report the mean and standard deviation of the
results for 10 different splits.
3.3. Experimental Parameters
We use the same training procedure for all databases.
The CNN architecture that we used is as follows: two con-
volutional layers of 32 filters of size 7 × 7 and 64 filters of
size 7×7, each followed by max pooling layers of size 2×2.
The convolutional and pooling layers are followed by two
fully connected layers of size 2000 each, and finally the out-
put. We use rectifier activation function s(x) = max(x, 0)
for all layers, and apply dropout with 0.5 probability of dis-
carding activations to both fully connected layers.
MEB codes of dimensionality K = 256, 1024 are as-
signed to each user. All training images are re-sized to
m × m = 64 × 64 and roughly aligned using eye center
locations. For augmentation we use n× n = 57× 57 crops
yielding 64 crops per image. Each crop is also illumina-
tion normalized using the algorithm in [19]. We train the
network by minimizing the cross-entropy loss against user
codes for 20 epochs using mini-batch stochastic gradient
descent with a batch size of 200. 5 of the training samples
are initially used for validation to determine the mentioned
training parameters. Once the network is trained, the SHA-
512 hashes of the codes are stored as the protected templates
and the original codes are purged. During verification, crops
are extracted from the new sample, pre-processed, and fed
through the trained network. Finally, the SHA-512 hash of
each crop is calculated and matched to the stored template,
yielding the matching score in Equation 7.
Figure 2: Genuine and imposter distributions from PIE (left), Yale (mid) and Multi-PIE (right) databases.
Table 1: Verification results obtained from various datasets.
Database BoS (K) GAR@0FAR EER
PIE 256 93.22± 2.61% 1.39± 0.20%
1024 90.13± 4.30% 1.14± 0.14%
Yale 256 96.74± 1.35% 0.93± 0.18%
1024 96.49± 2.30% 0.71± 0.17%
Multi-PIE 256 95.93± 0.55% 1.92± 0.27%
1024 97.12± 0.45% 0.90± 0.13%
Table 2: Performance comparison with other algorithms on
PIE dataset.
Method BoS (K) GAR@1FAR EER
Hybrid Approach [5] 210 90.61% 6.81%
BDA [4] 76 96.38% −
MEB Encoding 1024 97.59% 1.14%
3.4. Results
The results of our experiments are shown in Table 1. We
report the mean and standard deviation of GAR at zero FAR,
and EER for the 10 different train-test splits at bits of secu-
rity (BoS) or K = 256, 1024. We achieve GARs up to
∼ 90% on PIE, ∼ 96% on Yale, and ∼ 97% on Multi-PIE
with up to 1024 bits of security at the strict operating point
of zero FAR. During experimentation we observed that our
results were stable with respect to K, making the param-
eter selectable purely on the basis of desired template se-
curity. A comparison of our results to other face template
protection algorithms on the PIE database is shown in Table
2. Our algorithm offers significantly higher template secu-
rity with true 1024 BoS due to the MEB codes. In terms
of matching performance we outperform [5], which offers
acceptable BoS, and are comparable to [4], which lacks in
adequate BoS for protection against brute force attacks.
4. Security Analysis
We analyze the security of the system in a stolen tem-
plate scenario. The attacker has possession of the protected
templates, knowledge of the template generation algorithm,
and the CNN parameters. Given these, the attacker’s goal
is to extract information about the original biometric of the
users. The only assumption we make is that the hash func-
tion we use follows the random oracle model. Due to this,
given the hash digests, the attacker cannot extract any in-
formation about the MEB codes assigned to the users. This
removes the possibility of using the CNN parameters to re-
verse engineer the face from the secure codes. Now, the
only way in which the attacker can get the codes is by brute
forcing through all possible values the codes can take, hash
each one, and compare to the hashed templates. Since the
minimum code length we use is 256 bits, the search space
is of the order of 2256 or larger, making brute force attacks
computationally infeasible.
Another possibility of an attack could be brute force in
the input domain i.e. feed random noise or faces into the
network and hope for a match. This comes down to the
question of the entropy of faces in general, which is be-
yond the scope of this paper but, we do empirically analyze
the behavior of the network under such attacks. So far, the
imposter scores have been calculated using other enrolled
users. We now analyze the score distribution when face
samples that have not been seen by the network are fed to it.
For this experiment, we enroll samples from Extended Yale
B Database and use all the faces in Multi-PIE as imposter
samples. In addition to unseen faces, we also feed 1 million
samples of random noise through the network. The results
of this experiment are shown in Figure 3 with the attack dis-
tribution representing the scores for faces from Multi-PIE
and the random noise. It can be seen that the scores for the
attack data are always zero and well separated from the gen-
uine scores, empirically verifying the security of the system
to attacks in the input space.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a template protection algorithm which
achieves provable security by using MEB codes to address
the issue of uniformity, and relying on the strength of stan-
dard hash functions. We achieved high (∼ 95%) GARs at
the strict operating point of zero FAR and showed that the
exceptional performance of deep CNNs can be utilized to
minimize loss of matching accuracy in template protection
Figure 3: Genuine and imposter distributions for attacks in
the input space.
algorithms. The current work deals with the problem of us-
ing faces as passwords in controlled environments, and we
plan to extend our results to faces in uncontrolled environ-
ments, other biometric modalities, and broader applications
like Microsoft Windows picture passwords. Our future ef-
forts also seek to make a formal analysis of our algorithm
from an information theoretic perspective.
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